Page 1
STATE OF ILLINOIS ) ) SS.
COUNTY OF C O O K )
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT-FOURTH DISTRICT
WESLEY TERRACE CONDOMINIUM ) ASSOCIATION, )
Plaintiff, )
-vs- ) No. 16 M4 000881
CHRISTOPHER STOLLER and ) MICHAEL STOLLER, )
Defendants. )
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS had at the hearing of
the above-entitled cause, before the Honorable Kevin
Lee, one of the Judges of said Court, on
October 13, 2016, at the hour of approximately
2:30 p.m., at Room 111, 1500 Maybrook Drive, Maywood,
Illinois.

```
Page 2
1
    PRESENT:
2
          BY: MR. CHRISTOPHER STOLLER,
               (PO Box 4195
3
                Oak Park, Illinois 60302)
              Appeared on behalf of the Defendant,
 4
              Christopher Stoller;
 5
 6
          KOVITZ, SHIFRIN & NESBIT,
 7
          BY: MR. RONALD KAPUSTKA,
               (175 North Archer Avenue,
                Mundelein, Illinois 60060-2301)
 8
                    (847) 777-7316
              Appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff;
 9
10
11
          LAW OFFICE OF WAYNE D. RHINE,
              MR. WAYNE D. RHINE,
12
          BY:
               (309 West Washington Street, Suite 500
13
                Chicago, Illinois 60606)
                 (312) 589-5832
              Appeared on behalf of the Defendant,
14
              Michael Stoller.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
```

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Page 3

THE CLERK: Wesley Terrace versus

Christopher Stoller.

MR. STOLLER: Stoller, ready.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. KAPUSTKA: Good afternoon, Judge.

Ronald Kapustka, K-a-p-u-s-t-k-a, for the plaintiff.

MR. RHINE: Good afternoon, your Honor.

Wayne Rhine.

MR. STOLLER: Good afternoon, Judge. For the record, Christopher Stoller for Christopher Stoller, plaintiff.

MR. KAPUSTKA: Defendant. Judge, he's the defendant.

MR. STOLLER: Yeah, defendant, Judge.

Judge, we have three matters up today. We have a ruling on the Motion to Dismiss and a 137 corrected Motion to Produce Documents and Judge Rhine's Motion to Intervene. And, Judge, I'd like to start out, for the record, Judge, of the -- May I run back and fourth sometimes, Judge? Sometimes I have to sit down. I postponed my knee surgery for the 29th of September.

THE COURT: No, that's fine. Let me just ask a question, first. My recollection was that the

Page 4 parties had agreed that today was just a date for 1 ruling. 2 MR. KAPUSTKA: That was your last order, 3 correct. 4 MR. STOLLER: That's correct, Judge. 5 THE COURT: Are you proposing that you want 6 to go back and forth and make some additional 7 8 arguments? MR. STOLLER: No, Judge, what I'd like to 9 do, I want to make my record here since I have my 10 court reporter, on some of the key issues that I think 11 will help this Court and make a good record so we have 12 a proper record, especially on standing, to start out 13 with in this.case. That's one of the most important 14 15 issues. THE COURT: But you've fully briefed that 16 17 issue. MR. STOLLER: I did brief it and I could 18 incorporate my reference into the record, but I have 19 some additional issues that could help the Court 20 with --21 MR. KAPUSTKA: Which, of course, I have not 22 seen, so that's prejudicial. 23

MR. STOLLER: It's argument. It's all part

Page 5

1 of the record.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

MR. KAPUSTKA: Judge, if I have may, and I don't want to interrupt, but --

THE COURT: And I appreciate that.

MR. KAPUSTKA: But we've had this order for several months. This was for ruling only. Your Honor specifically told us when we wrote the order, it's for ruling, not for argument.

THE COURT: That's my recollection as well.

MR. KAPUSTKA: I can get the order out and show Mr. Stoller if he doesn't remember.

THE COURT: We agreed that the issues had been fully briefed and that it was now just up for ruling.

MR. STOLLER: All right, Judge.

THE COURT: The one thing that wasn't fully worked out I guess was the Motion to Intervene, because that was filed I think after some of these other things.

MR. RHINE: That's correct.

THE COURT: Then you didn't get a copy initially, and as far as I remember, you've never had an opportunity to respond to that. So we'll put that one to the side, but I'll decide the other motions and

Page 6

then we'll determine what needs to be done with that one.

So my inventory of motions shows I have a 2619 Motion to Dismiss from the plaintiff, a Rule 137 Motion for Sanctions -- I'm sorry. From the defendant, Christopher Stoller. Rule 137 Motion For Sanctions from Christopher Stoller. A Request For Judicial Notice from Christopher Stoller. Motion to Produce from Christopher Stoller. Corrected Motion to Produce from Christopher Stoller. The Motion to Intervene from Michael Stoller, and a motion from the plaintiff for use and occupancy.

MR. STOLLER: One other, Judge, if I may.

There was also a Memorandum of Law in support of the Motion For Judicial Notice and the Motion to Dismiss 137 sanctions.

THE COURT: I did receive all of those. So

I'll accept that amendment to the list I read off
that's currently pending before the Court.

Okay. So this is a case where plaintiff and defendant, Christopher Stoller, entered into a lease for the property designated at 415 Wesley, Unit 1, Oak Park, Illinois, on October 30th of 2015. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendant failed to pay \$2,252

Page 7

in rent in violation of the lease which was attached to the complaint executed by both the plaintiff and defendant.

Plaintiff served a five-day notice on the defendant and brought this forcible entry and detainer action for both possession and judgment.

At issue in the case is, plaintiff's complaint alleges that Wesley Terrace Condominium Association is the owner of the property at 415 Wesley, Unit 1. However, the lease entered into between the parties contains the name of Wesley Court Condominium Association. The word court is lined out, and the word terrace is written in.

In the first and second paragraphs of the lease agreement, additionally, the signature block for the landlord at the conclusion of the lease contains the name Wesley Terrace handwritten in before the words Condominium Association. Defendant asserts that the version of the lease that he signed does not contain these modifications.

As the Court sees it, the following facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff alleges that Wesley

Terrace Condominium Association is the owner of the property in the complaint. Wesley Terrace Condominium

Page 8

Association and Wesley Court Condominium Association are separate corporations. At the time the contract was signed, the lessor was listed as Wesley Court Condominium Association. It was modified to reflect that there was a lease between Wesley Terrace Condominium Association and defendant.

The lease itself at paragraph 26 states, Any provision of this lease may be modified, waived discharged, only by an instrument in writing, signed by the party against whom that enforcement of such modification, waiver or discharge is sought.

So with regard to defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, defendant argues that the alteration of the
lease was both material and fraudulent. Defendant
argues that Wesley Terrace Condominium Association is
a separate legal entity from Wesley Court Condominium
Association and has no standing to bring this forcible
entry and detainer action.

Plaintiffs have argued variously that the issues raised by defendant are served and should be addressed at trial in response to the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Section 4. Plaintiff suggests in this motion for use and occupancy, that the modification of the lease is merely a typographical

Page 9

error which the plaintiff characterizes as a misnomer.

This wasn't specifically the reply brief to the Motion to Dismiss, however, the Court will address it. Misnomer is defined as a situation where the correct parties in the case are in the case. However, one of the parties referenced is referenced by an incorrect name.

Typically misnomer is not a basis for dismissal because misnomer can be corrected by amending the pleading, which is an argument that has been raised by the plaintiff in this case.

The instant case, however, does not meet the definition of misnomer. First, in the error or modification of the document is not in the pleadings as is ordinarily the case with misnomer. It is in the lease, the contract upon which the complaint is based.

If the problem was simply a case of misnomer, the plaintiff could have sought to amend the complaint to correct the misnomer. However, no motion to amend has been brought in eight months that this case has been pending, as it is the contract itself that is incorrect or at least inconsistent, not the pleading.

It is clear to the Court that the lease was

Page 10

modified because it contains handwritten information which is not in the version of the lease attached to defendant's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit 4. Moreover, there's nothing in the record to suggest that a modification was completed in accordance with Paragraph 26 of the lease, and signed by Mr. Stoller, the party against whom the plaintiff seeks to enforce it.

Consequently, Defendants 2619A9 Motion to
Dismiss the forcible entry and detainer action brought
by plaintiff, Wesley Terrace Condominium Association,
is granted and the case is dismissed as it is
predicated on a contract that was executed with a
different corporate entity, Wesley Court Condominium
Association.

At various points the plaintiff has made arguments that the defendant shouldn't be allowed to live free without paying for rent. Nothing in this ruling is intended to suggest that the plaintiffs are permanently precluded from being compensated for the rental unit occupied by defendant. However, the instant complaint is defective for the reasons stated and will be dismissed.

Next, moving to the Rule 137 Motion For

Page 11

Sanctions. The defendant has moved to sanction plaintiffs for filing this forcible entry and detainer action arguing that it was an abuse of process and harassing. Sanctions are appropriate if there is a violation of Rule 137 which states that the signer of a pleading certifies that he or she has performed a reasonable inquiry and has concluded, to the best of his or her knowledge, information and belief, that the pleading, motion or other paper is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or good faith argument for suspension, modification or reversal.

Sanctions are warranted if the pleader knew or should have known that the material allegations of fact the signer pled, were false. In this case Wesley Terrace Condominium Association is the plaintiff, and the plaintiff alleges in the complaint that plaintiff and defendant entered into a condominium lease agreement for the aforementioned premises commencing on November 1, 2015 through October 31, 2016. This is not true. Wesley Court Condominium Association and defendant entered into a condominium lease agreement.

A reasonable investigation of the modified lease agreement attached to the complaint with the handwritten assertions or insertions would have put

Page 12

plaintiff's counsel on notice as to this fact.

Consequently, Defendant's Motion For Sanctions will be

3 granted.

Now, the Court will hear argument and/or will entertain written submissions as to what an appropriate sanction will be. The Court does not make that ruling at this juncture.

Next, the motion, Defendant's Motion For

Judicial Notice. Defendant requests that this Court

take judicial notice of, among other things, the fact

that plaintiff's attorney vowed to get even with

defendant in several affidavits which are in some

instances duplicative of documents previously filed by

the parties.

The Court agrees with the defendant, I'm sorry, with the plaintiff, that some of the purported material that defendant seeks to have the Court take judicial notice of is hearsay and/or not appropriate for judicial notice by the Court. However, in light of the Court's ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, the Motion For Judicial Notice is moot.

Defendant's Motion to Produce is also moot in light of the Court's ruling on the Motion to Dismiss.

Page 13

That leaves us with the Motion For Use and Occupancy. Plaintiff is seeking use and occupancy during the pendency of the action. The Court questions the validity of the motion for use and occupancy by this plaintiff since the plaintiff was not a party to the contract upon which this forcible entry and detainer action is based.

Nonetheless, plaintiff's motion for use and occupancy is now moot in light of the Court's ruling on the Motion to Dismiss.

The only remaining motion then would be defendant, Michael Stoller's, Motion to Intervene.

MR. RHINE: Judge, that also would be moot since there is no pending pleading before the Court. There's nothing to intervene.

THE COURT: Right. That would be the Court's view on it.

So as the Court sees it, the only other piece of business we have is to resolve the Motion For Sanctions.

MR: STOLLER: Judge, I would like to request, respectfully, Judge, we submit inquiring, as you suggested, our injuries concerning the sanction motion and present it to the Court in writing.

Page 14

THE COURT: Mr. Kapustka.

MR. KAPUSTKA: Judge, I believe based on his motion, we have a right to amend our pleadings.

Incumbent in a written lease is also the oral agreement, the oral agreement between the landlord and Mr. Stoller. So although I didn't plead it, it's inferred that there is an oral agreement between the association in which this unit is located, and Mr. Stoller.

Clearly Mr. Stoller has some agreement with someone to live in this unit. If he has no contract with somebody, he is a squatter and should be dragged out. There's an oral agreement. Mr. Stoller paid monies to an association to live in the unit. We request 14 days to file an amended complaint.

MR. STOLLER: Judge, I would object.

MR. KAPUSTKA: You can.

MR. STOLLER: First of all, he talks about an oral agreement, the Statute of Frauds is very clear. Any agreement in the amount of over \$500 has to be in writing. He's waived that issue, Judge. He hasn't brought it in front of you. You ruled. This is the case law, Judge. Your order is an order of the Court. Now for him to arbitrarily come up with this

Page 15

arbitrarily capricious --

MR. KAPUSTKA: I'd be happy to submit case law on the issue, Judge.

THE COURT: You can let him talk. I'll hear both sides out.

MR. STOLLER: All right. Judge, it's not appropriate for him to make an oral motion concerning an oral agreement. Judge, that's ludicrous. But he is --

THE COURT: Hold on, Mr. Stoller. What it sounds like I'm hearing from you would be your upcoming Motion to Dismiss his amended complaint.

You're not suggesting -- what I'm not hearing from you is a reason for him not to file it.

MR. STOLLER: Well, I'll give you the law on it, Judge. I have it right here. It's the standing issue here. I'm going to give you the Gilbert case, Judge. I have it right here. This is under -- you know, he doesn't understand corporate contract or process torts, Judge. It's quite obvious because he's waived all those arguments.

THE COURT: Why don't you stick to the law and the facts.

MR. STOLLER: The law is any alteration of a

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Page 16

1 | written instrument that so changes its terms as to

2 give it a different legal effect from its original,

3 and thus work some changes and its rights, obligations

4 or interests, relations to parties is a material

5 | alteration and renders the instrument void.

Regardless of whether the alteration was by internal substitution, change of words or insurance by deleting some material provisions. If I can tender in --

MR. KAPUSTKA: Judge, that relates to the written --

MR. STOLLER: I'm still arguing.

MR. KAPUSTKA: That relates to the written contract which your Honor has already ruled on. This is with regard to the oral agreement between Mr. Stoller, who moved in to a Wesley Terrace unit and submitted checks to Wesley Terrace.

THE COURT: Okav.

MR. STOLLER: Judge.

THE COURT: You can give me a final point and then I'm going to rule on this.

MR. STOLLER: Judge, I ask you to look at the checks. It was for Wesley Condo Association.

Under the UCC1, they improperly endorsed those checks.

It's called check fraud, and there's a pending matter

Page 17

with the authorities on that because --

THE COURT: Let's stick to this case.

MR. STOLLER: But anyhow, standing, Judge, that's the issue here. The validity of standing, and I'm going to give you the case and I'm going to show it to you. İt's Deutsche Bank National Trust versus Gilbert, 212 Illinois 2nd, 120, 164, from the Second District. The validity, the doctrine of standing is designed to preclude persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit.

Raintree Homes versus Village of Long Grove,
209 Illinois 2nd. A party's standing to sue must be
determined as of the time the suit is filed. That's
the Village of Kildeer versus Village of Lake Zurich.
A party either has standing at the time the suit is
brought or it cannot amend, Judge, and here's the
Gilbert case. It cannot amend their case. Standing
has to be established at the time the suit was filed.

This is the leading authority here. It's a little rough, Judge, but I know the case because I went to the Appellate Court on this issue. The First and the Second District twice. I understand this Deutsche case standing. It's the leading authority.

24 | It has to be established.

Page 18

Wesley Terrace Condominium Association is not the lessor. They don't own the property, Judge. There is no agreement from the parties that they do own it. They do not own the unit. It's Priscilla Wright. If you read my affidavit, she owns it.

In their complaint they say they own the property, Judge. They mislead the Court. I attached a certified copy of the deed. They have no interest in that property.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a couple questions, Mr. Stoller.

Is it your contention because of the defect in the lease agreement, that you will be able to reside in that unit, let me finish my question, indefinitely without ever paying anyone rent or compensation for it?

MR. STOLLER: Judge.

THE COURT: Answer my question, please.

MR. STOLLER: I'm going to answer your question. Wesley Terrace, Mr. Kapustka and his crew, do not have an interest in that property. They have no say so whether or not I pay rent or not. It's Priscilla Wright. And I have agreements with the owner of the property, Judge.

Page 19

MR. KAPUSTKA: Your Honor, if I may.

Mr. Stoller is lying. I spoke to Priscilla Wright's attorney yesterday. There is no such agreement and, in fact, she's suing him.

MR. STOLLER: She's not, Judge. There's no pending case.

MR. KAPUSTKA: Well, that's true. Be that as it may, Judge, unfortunately for Mr. Stoller --

MR. STOLLER: But he --

MR. KAPUSTKA: Excuse me, Mr. Stoller. I didn't speak. I didn't interrupt you. So now it's your turn to listen to me.

THE COURT: He has been very patient.

MR. KAPUSTKA: Right, I have been.

So what Mr. Stoller forgets is that he wrote checks to Wesley Terrace prior to this lawsuit being filed. Mr. Stoller paid rent to Wesley Terrace. He created a contract between himself and Wesley Terrace. He forgets about these checks. He doesn't want you to know about these checks. Yes, some were paid to Wesley Court. Some were paid to Wesley Terrace. There's a copy.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I think I've heard enough on this issue.

Page 20

I want to make this clear. The Court's ruling was a narrow one. The complaint that I have and the lease upon which it was predicated do not line up, and under the law I thought the appropriate action to take was to dismiss it based upon the Defendant's 2619 motion. And whenever you dismiss a complaint, that leaves open the determination to make by the Court whether the party, the plaintiff, will be allowed to take an opportunity to try to amend the complaint and state a valid cause of action. And what I'm hearing from the plaintiff is that they believe that they have theories available to them upon which they could state a valid cause of action.

I'm not going to foreclose them before they ever satisfy what those theories are by filing a complaint saying that they can't do it. I'll give the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint if they so choose to do so and, Mr. Stoller, once they do file it you can re-file the arguments that you stated and you can bring in a motion or you can answer or otherwise plead as you see fit.

I don't know what plaintiff's attorney, what theories he may pursue or what the validity of those theories will be in advance, so I'm not going to

Page 21

preclude him from filing it. And once he files it, then you can take a look at it and decide what your strategy will be with regard to it.

MR. STOLLER: Judge, of course as you know anyone can file anything with this Court. They are not stopped. What I --

THE COURT: If I were dismissing it with prejudice then he would have to take it --

MR. STOLLER: I understand. But what I suggest, I would stay that pending our evidentiary hearing on the 137 which you granted, and then after that --

MR. KAPUSTKA: Judge, those two have no bearing on each other. We can still proceed on an amended complaint separate and apart from whatever his 137 sanction motion might be.

MR. STOLLER: I didn't finish.

THE COURT: Let him finish.

MR. KAPUSTKA: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: We're going to let you finish, but let me correct you. I didn't say we'd have an evidentiary hearing. I just said I would decide the Motion For Sanctions after written submissions or something else to be agreed with. I don't know that

Page 22

we need to have a full blown evidentiary hearing.

MR. STOLLER: Judge, I'll file my pleading that you gave us a right to do, and I think whether we have an evidentiary hearing or whether you rule from the bench based on what I filed is discretionary, and I'll abide by what the Court wants to do.

THE COURT: You can submit affidavits.

MR. STOLLER: We can submit affidavits. But I think it would be proper to terminate this aspect of the case because the 137 is germane to the Motion to Dismiss, and it goes to their conduct. So 137 is sanctionable for what they did. Now if they start right now filing another amended pleading and we divert from that issue, I think it would be judicially proper first to dispose of the sanction and then let him amend if he wants to.

MR. KAPUSTKA: Judge, we're going to be three months down the road and he'll be there for another three months not paying rent. That is not proper to this association or to Ms. Wright. They both have rights to the unit which Mr. Stoller is preventing them from.

MR. STOLLER: He doesn't represent Ms. Wright.

Page 23

MR. KAPUSTKA: No, that's true, but I spoke to her attorney yesterday, you have not.

This is just a delay tactic on Mr. Stoller's part like they all have been. It is improper to have this thing hanging over the association's head for the next 3 to 6 months, however long it's going to take him to have his operation and submit his affidavits, do all the other things he's going to do.

I'll amend within 14 days and he can file his affidavits in support of his Motion For Sanctions along with his Motion to Dismiss my amended complaint.

THE COURT: Yeah, it troubles me how long this case has taken and I don't want to delay it any further. So I'm going to allow these two things to go on simultaneously. I don't know that it will take the same amount of time to resolve both issues, but I'm going to allow him to file his amended complaint within 14 days. You can file your affidavits or whatever you want to file in support.

MR. STOLLER: Judge, I would ask for

28 days. I have an appeal in the Ninth Circuit. I

have an appeal in the Colorado Supreme Court, a brief

that has to go in and a Ninth Circuit. I have a case,

two cases in the DC Federal Court I have to attend to.

day? ·

Page 24

Judge Rhine and I have cases in the First and Second
District Appellate Court, and I'm just a solo guy,
Judge. I need 28 days because I've got a heavy, heavy
schedule that I have to workout.

THE COURT: I assume that Mr. Kapustka wouldn't have any problem with that in light that it's not going to delay.

MR. KAPUSTKA: Yeah. If he wants 28 days for his affidavits, no problem. Let's set up the briefing schedule now for my amended complaint.

MR. STOLLER: Let him get his amended complaint in first, Judge. Then one thing I would ask, Judge, is I would ask that we be able to have the court reporter, I'll have her transcribe this on an emergency basis in one day, and then we'll prepare an order based on the transcript because we had a lot of information come into this order. It's a complex case, and I'd like to be able to submit a proposed order to Mr. Kapustka and the Court, based on your ruling, and the court reporter so we have a good order, and we can do that.

Ms. Court Reporter, you can have that in a

THE REPORTER: Sure.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Page 25

THE COURT: I don't particularly have a problem with that. I think we will probably have a better record.

MR. STOLLER: Yeah, we'll have a better record.

THE COURT: I think the record will be important in this case.

MR. RHINE: Does your Honor wish to set a date by which the submissions as to the 137?

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Stoller has suggested 28 days. That's fine.

MR. RHINE: Okay.

MR. KAPUSTKA: So the mechanics of this,

Judge, is Mr. Stoller is going to get the record.

He's going to prepare a proposed order which he is

going to E-mail to me, to which I will respond before
he submits it to your Honor, is that correct?

MR. STOLLER: I agree on that, judge.

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. KAPUSTKA: Actually, that worked last time. He did E-mail me and I did respond that I got it so that worked out perfectly.

THE COURT: We're making progress. That way once I get it, it's been looked at by both sides.

Page 26

MR. KAPUSTKA: And I can indicate my agreement by signing it and sending it back to him.

MR. STOLLER: Sure. We'll work it out, you know. You know, Judge, Mr. Kapustka is a very good lawyer in this Court. He performs excellent and I say he is well qualified. And as you know --

MR. KAPUSTKA: Judge, I have a meeting to get to at 3:30 in Northbrook.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STOLLER: It's going to require a lot of work going into this order to make it proper.

MR: RHINE: Does your Honor want this proposed order to include the 14 days to amend and the period of time in which to submit the request for the 137 sanctions all in one order?

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, actually, case law that I looked at said that the Motion For Sanctions should be in a separate order.

MR. RHINE: Okay.

MR. STOLLER: We will prepare a separate order.

THE COURT: You can put that in a separate order. So the order with the substantive rulings, we can hold that open until you guys --

Page 27 MR. RHINE: So just a simple order setting a 1 time limit in which to submit the request for 2 sanctions? 3 THE COURT: Yes. 4 MR. KAPUSTKA: That's the order we will 5 enter today and say there's a more comprehensive order 6 7 coming? THE COURT: Yes. 8 MR. KAPUSTKA: I already started one. 9 THE COURT: Well, the more comprehensive 10 order will be addressing all the rulings. 11 MR. KAPUSTKA: Correct. That Mr. Stoller is 12 going to prepare and submit to my office. 13 THE COURT: Yes. But the Motion For 14 Sanctions should be on a separate order. 15 MR. RHINE: There I'll include 28 days which 16 to submit our request for --17 MR. STOLLER: Sanctions. 18 THE COURT: Yes, absolutely. 19 MR. RHINE: Thank you, your Honor. I'll 20 prepare a separate order for that. 21 MR. KAPUSTKA: Judge Rhine, you're going to 22 work on the sanctions order and I'll work on the 23 amending and 28-day order? 24

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Page 28

1 MR. RHINE: Right.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. KAPUSTKA: Judge, do we need a new date?

THE COURT: To come back?

MR. KAPUSTKA: Yes.

MR. STOLLER: Judge, I would ask if
Mr. Kapustka is going to file his -- if he is going to
file his amended motion, and I'm sure he is, I would
need 28 days to respond to it and then we can set up.

MR. KAPUSTKA: We can put that in this order, that's fine. He has 28 days to answer or otherwise plead, get a status date in seven weeks.

THE COURT: That's fine. I'll have to confirm it with Dena when she gets back, the specific date, the seven weeks. Will that take us into the new year?

MR. KAPUSTKA: No, it will take us to

December. Two weeks from today is the 27th. Four

weeks from then is Thanksgiving or you can have to the

28th, whatever. Then probably that December 5th for

status. Is that back on a forcible call or just a

status date?

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah we were putting most of the dates because we are not going to have this

Page 29 Thursday call anymore. We are giving the updates in the new year. I think the first one was January 9, I believe. WHICH WERE ALL THE PROCEEDINGS HAD AT THE HEARING OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 

Page 30 STATE OF ILLINOIS ) 1 SS. COUNTY OF C O O K ) 2 3 I, Stephanie Apostolos, a Certified 4 Shorthand Reporter doing business in the County of 5 Cook and State of Illinois, do hereby certify that I 6 reported in machine shorthand the proceedings at the 7 hearing of the above-entitled cause. 8 I further certify that the foregoing is a 9 true and correct transcript of said proceedings as 10 appears from the stenographic notes so taken and 11 12 transcribed by me. 13 14 15 16 CSR No. 84-3286 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24